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An important classes of externalities are those involving congestion.  The costs of congestion are 
not trivial.  For example, the 2005 Urban Mobility Report by the Texas Transportation Institute 
estimated that the cost of traffic congestion at 63 billion per year in the United States.   
Congestion can be viewed in some instances as a result of coordination failures among those 
using  a  congestible  resource.    In  these  cases,  congestion  costs  can  be  reduced  if  market 
participants can learn to coordinate. This papers reports the results of experiments on the ability 
of students to tacitly coordinate in the use of a congestible good.   Treatments examine how 
uncertainty and entry fees influence the outcomes. 
  We use the Market Entry Game (MEG), originally studied in experiments by Kahneman 
(1988), as the starting point for our analysis. The MEG models static binary decision problems in 
environments with many participants and where the entry of any participant creates a negative 
externality for all who choose the same action.
2 MEG experiments place subjects in interactive 
environments with similar characteristics to those observed in congestion problems (e.g., traffic 
congestion).  In contrast to many coordination games, experiments based on the MEG often find 
a high degree of coordination
3 (Van Huyck et al. (1990 & 1991)  and  (Cooper et al. 1992)). 
 
                                            
2 Minority Games have been studied in the fields of computational social sciences. Examples of minority games are 
"El Farol" problem (Arthur 1994, Manuca et. al 1998 , Bottazzi and Devetag. 2007,, Kets 2007}  these games have 
similar strategic interactions than those one of the MEG but the literature analyzed these two similar problems have 
remained mostly disconnected. 
3 Kahneman’s words about the MEG in his Nobel price laureates ceremony: 
“The results, although not surprising to an economist, struck me as magical. Within very few 
trials, a pattern emerged in which the number of entrants, N, was within 1 or 2 of N*, with no 
obvious systematic tendency to be higher or lower than N*. The group was doing the right thing 
collectively, although conversations with the participants and the obvious statistical analyses did 
not reveal any consistent strategies that made sense. It took me some time to realize that the 
magic we were observing was an equilibrium: the pattern we saw existed because no other 
pattern could be sustained. This idea had not been in my intellectual bag of tools. We never 
formally published the N* game - I described it informally in Kahneman (1987) - but it has been 
taken up by others (Erev & Rapoport, 1998)”.  
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. These environments usually have multiple equilibria making difficult to achieve either 
of them without a mechanism to tacitly coordinate. Failure to achieve equilibrium behavior is 
costly. The aggregated profit of those participants in a MEG depends on the capability of the 
agents to tacitly coordinate. Failures to co-ordinate or over entry cause costs to the entrants but 
also under entry might generate costs given the it will imply that there is investment in slack 
capacity.  To understand what policies can work. First we need to understand how the  existence 
of relationships between system capacities potential users and entry fees affect the number of 
entrants..    
This study focuses on the following questions: 
1.  How does the capacity affect tacit coordination? 
2.  How does uncertainty regarding system capacity affect market outcomes? 
3.  How effective and efficient are entry fees (a classic mechanism for managing congestion) 
to induce changes in entry?  
In section I the theoretical model of the market entry game is developed, and the individual 
problem and the market designer problem are described.  The section illustrates how the policy 
maker  can  maximize  social  welfare  and  deduce  the  optimal  entry  fee  that  aligns  social  and 
individual incentives.   Section II describes how the experimental design.  Section III presents 




I. Theoretical Framework  
  
The  market  entry  game  is  a  simple  simultaneous  decision  one-shot  game;  subjects’  strategy 
space has two possible actions; stay-out or enter.  
If an individual chooses to stay out, then their payoff is certain.  If they choose to enter, then 
their payoff depends on the number of agents who also choose this option. The MEG payoff 
function, where the payoffs for the action of entering are linearly decreasing by the number of 
entrants, can be described as: 
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Where v is the value of the outside option. The parameters b,r,c,t and f characterize a market.  
Where b is the intrinsic value of the market, r is the market profit multiplier, c represents the 
market capacity, t is the entry cost and f is the entry.  
  
The MEG has   asymmetric equilibria in pure strategy Nash Equilibria where h players enter 





where x is the equilibrium number of entrants. The equilibrium number of entrants is determined 
by the parameters of the market (c,t,r,f), and is given by 
(1)                                          
 
  In this game there are also mixed strategy equilibria. When players are symmetric, then 
there is unique symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium where agents enter with probability  
 
(2)                                 
 
 
There are multiple asymmetric mixed strategy equilibria where one agent or a subset of agents 
decides to enter with different probabilities. 
 
  It is important to notice the effects of the implementation that an entry fee has on the 
individual incentives and the market entry.  First, individual payoff function, a positive entry fee  
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(  ) decreases the intrinsic value of the market option. No matter what the other subjects do 
for each possible level of entrance, the market is less attractive now than what it was without the 
entry  fee.    Equation  (1)  implies  that  the  fee  reduces  the  number  of  entrants  in  equilibrium. 
Second, it might make the subject change his beliefs about the others possible behavior
4 
 
The problem of the market designer (MD) is to design a fee that induces optimal entry. The 
optimal entry level is the solution to the following problem 
 
(3)   
 
Where C is an arbitrary the social cost faced by the society when the goal of satisfying the 
demand or capacity of the market c is not achieved. Here, in contrast to previous market entry 
research, we assume that the market designer is interested in meeting a demand of size c.  
 
The optimal fee makes the first order condition of the individual problem to the first order 
conditions of the MD designer at the socially optimal level. The optimal fees satisfies: 
 
(4)       
When  this  condition  is  satisfied  any  individual  deviating  from  the  social  optimum  cannot 
improve his payoff.   From the last two equations  we can observe  that both the social optimal 
social level of entrance
 x
so=x(v,k,c,r,C)  and  the optimal entry fee f*=f (v,k,c,r,C) are both  
functions  of  the  fundamental  characteristics  of  the  market  as  (v,k,c,r,C).    We  use  these 
relationships to build our experimental design.   
 
                                            
4 Notice that theoretically if we assume that all the individuals have the same degree of 
rationality and homogenous preferences regarding strategic risk aversion and traditional risk 
aversion, then they should form consistent beliefs before and after the imposition of the entry fee 
and nothing should change except the number of entrants. If individuals believe that there are 
heterogeneous preferences regarding risk aversions then the imposition of an entry fee might 
change individuals’ expectation regarding future action profiles to be observed  
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II. Experimental Design 
The canonical MEG was modified in two ways for this study. First, in the canonical game, the 
capacity  of  the  market  (e.g.,  the  number  of  cars  the  road  can  handle)  is  fixed  and  known.  
However, in real world settings, the capacity may be uncertain.  To study the consequences of 
uncertainty, we consider two types of treatments in our baseline treatments capacity is known. 
The capacity of the market is a random variable with publicly known distribution defines the 
Expected Market Entry Game (EMEG) treatment..  In the EMEG, the expected capacity for each 
sub-treatment is the same that the correspondent in the baseline treatment.   
Second, in the canonical MEG the only cost of entry is the strategic risk.  In this study we 
introduce entry fees. This introduction separates the number of entrants in equilibrium from the 
capacity  of  the  market  by  numbers  that  are  more  than  one.
5  Two  types  of  entry  fees  are 
introduced, one type that should theoretically induce the social optimum and the other that does 
not.  The only prior study that considered the MEG with entry fees was Anderson et al. (2008).  
This was a classroom experiment without actual monetary payment.  We introduce monetary 
payoffs and multiple treatments to test response to entry fees, and capacity uncertainty.   
In  each  session  subjects  either  face  a  MEG  or  EMEG.    Twelve  subjects  per  session 
participate in a sequence of rounds that entail different pairs of capacity (or expected capacity) 
and entry fees. The baseline treatments of the design addressed to answer those questions related 
to  the  feasibility  of  entry  fees  as  optimal  policies  in  environments  with  possible  multiple 
equilibra in pure strategies.  The expected treatments are conducted with the aim of observing 
how additional uncertainty affects the behavior for the different parameters that characterize the 
sub-treatments treatments. 
The payoff function we implement in our experiment is a representation of the payoff 
function in 1.  In each sub-treatment of our experiment, the subjects will face the following 
payoff function. 
 
                                            
5 This means that when we create treatments where the number of entrants in equilibrium is a real small proportion 
of  all  the  potential  entrants,  then  these  environments  are  more  competitive  but  also  riskier.  They  are  more 
competitive because few numbers of participants should choose only the risky action in any equilibrium profile. In 
the search for some extra payoff, that is only possible when the number of entrants is below the equilibrium number,  
those willing to enter  are facing the possibility of the over entry and  
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If you choose Option A, your payoff will be:  17 
                                                                      
If you choose Option B, your payoff will be determined in the following way 
  
Individual Payoffs= 15+2 {ct-(# of participants choosing Option B)} –ft 
 
The canonical MEG (Rapport 1995) experiments presented symmetric players with b=v and fix 
cost of entry c=0 or entry fee f=0.  
Camerer (2003) remarked that the number of asymmetric pure strategy Nash Equilibria is 
usually increased in experimental implementations of the MEG. This happens  since the capacity 
is an integer number and the number of participants is an integer too, then h, the number of 
participants choosing Option B in any equilibrium profile can take usually more than one value. 
In the canonical MEG experiments without entry fees the number of entrants in any equilibrium 
profile was equal to c or c-1. It is usually the case that the marginal c entrant might be indifferent 
between  entering  or  not,  the  number  h  of  entrants  will  depend  on  the  parameters  of  payoff 
function. 
Our experimental design we fixed most of the fundamental characteristics of the market for all 






k  v  r  c  f 
1  15  17  2  4  -1 
2  15  17  2  4  0 
3  15  17  2  4  2 
4  15  17  2  8  0 
5  15  17  2  8  2 
6  15  17  2  8  4  
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Introducing Aggregated Uncertainty of the Market Capacity the Expected MEG treatment  
 
The introduction of the EMEG treatment in our experimental design is motivated by our second 
research question.  The goal behind the study of this treatment is to understand and quantify  the 
consequences of introducing capacity risk in a Market Entry Game environment. Traditionally in 
the MEG subjects always face strategic risk. This type of risk is implicit in any simultaneous 
decision game when participants do not know the action that the other players would take. The 
interaction of strategic risk and risk regarding the capacity value makes the EMEG treatment a 
highly uncertain environment. 
 
In the Market entry Game treatment the market capacity ct=(4,8) is a deterministic value.  In the 
EMEG, ct is a random variable,  with expected value E(ct ).  We have EMEG sub-treatments with 
expected values of ) 4 and 8.  For each sub-treatment, the capacity can take values that are equal 
to the expected value or 2 units above or below to them. These three possible values of the 
capacity are equally likely and independent of what the players play. 
  
Each treatment can be analyzed as a 2 by 3 experiment. For the sub-treatments with each 
possible level of market capacity, we design sub-reatments with 3 different possible levels of 
entry fee. We fixed the value of two variables for all the sub-treatments v=17, k=15 and r=2 in 
order to focus on the effects of the changes in capacity and entry fees. On the other hand, this 
payoff function differs from the one used by (Rapoport et al. 1998) where v=k=1, in our case 
v>k implying that there exists an implicit cost by entering Option B. In this case by deciding to 
take the riskier action subject are already paying something in order to achieve those possible 
higher payoffs.  We still maintain some of the features of the cited work r=2, N=12 and more 
importantly one of the two variables that we modify in our sub-treatments, the market capacity 
ct=(4,8) is also the one used by the cited work. The fact that we keep these variables fixed has the 
important implication that departing from the fix cost of choosing the option B or the imposition 
of the entry fee.   
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Entry Fee 
 
In our experiment we fixed arbitrarily the outside cost at C=6.  Then for market capacity of c=4, 
then optimal social level of entry are 2 and 3
6. For this level of capacity then the optimal entry 
fee is zero. For treatments with c=8, then exist a positive optimal entry fee that is equal to four. 
The numbers of entrants that characterize the Nash equilibria and mixed strategy probabilities of 
each sub-treatment are expressed in Table II 
 
Table II 
Treatment  1  2  3  4  5  6 
Capacity 
(c) 
4  4  4  8  8  8 
Entry Fee 
(f) 
-1  0  2  0  2  4 
x





In this paper we are interested in analyzing entry levels. Answers to our research questions can 
be provided through testing the following hypothesis, 
 
H1.   
Where  is the observed average number of entrants in the treatment l, MEG or EMEG, and j is 
the sub-treatment ranging from 1 to 6. 
H1 test if aggregated behavior is consistent with that of predicted RNNE for each one of our 
experimental treatments and sub-treatments.  Also at the same time because xt
RNNE=f(c,f) is a 
function of the parameters that characterize that sub-treatment market H! is directly related to our 
                                            
6 If the aggregated number of entrants is more or less two of the equilibria levels, then the cost of a unit generated by 
the market is 4. This means that for markets that are close to the equilibrium the cost (utility) of providing a unit 
then an exogenous cost of 6 (opportunity cost).   
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first research question.  Given that each observed   is a measure that summarize how the 
different monetary incentives induced by the sub-treatment affect the aggregated behavior of the 
participants. 
 
Understanding how accurate theoretical predictions are is a fundamental for policy makers as 
well as for applied economist interested in environments where first best are not the expected 
outcome. Because the MD in this a market entry game like situation can not control some of the 
characteristics  of  the  market  as  c,  C  and  the  outside  options  but  can  control    f  .  Then 
understanding the differences induced by the entry fee for a given set of characteristics provides 
the MD important knowledge for their proposals. 
 
The assumptions of risk neutrality and homogenous agents have had important implications for 
market design. Particularly in environments like the market entry game if agent are risk neutral 
then any new market option that present greater expected utility should induce a higher level of 
entrance. The argument works also in the opposite way when the market is dominated. The 
equilibrium conditions of the MEG are satisfied when a subject is indifferent between the market 
and the outside option. Our EMEG treatments modify the distribution of possible payoffs of a 
market but they do not modify the expected payoff of it in equilibria. Therefore even when the 
EMEG  has  implicit  more  risk  than  the  MEG  treatment  given  that  the  capacity  is  a  random 
variable. The expected returns in equilibria are the same. Then risk neutral subjects assuming 
equilibria  behavior  should  behave  in  the  same  in  the  EMEG  sub-treatments  that  in  their 
compared MEG ones. If the assumptions of risk neutrality, induce value theory and expected 
equilibria behavior hold then H2 should hold.  
 
H2.   
 
III. Experiment 
We  conducted  7  experimental  sessions  where  84  undergraduate  and  graduate  students 
participated as subjects  at the Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Sciences at George Mason 
University. In each session participants either faced MEG or EMEG environment, Upon arrival  
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to  the  laboratory  the  subjects  were  seated  at  one  of  the  12-computer  terminal  separated  by 
partitions.  The  experiment  was  programmed  and  conducted  with  the  software  z-Tree 
(Fischbacher 2007). Communication between subjects was prohibited. Written instructions and a 
series of record sheet were given to each participant. The participants first read the instructions in 
private. After they read the instructions the lab coordinator come back and read the instructions 
out loud. A short  practice example was then presented and followed by a quiz. The experiment 
started after reviewing the quiz. 
. 
The experiment consisted on 125 rounds of a binary decision environment.  The rounds were 
divided in six blocks of 25 rounds. For each block the market parameters remain constant and are 
those displayed in Table I. We conducted sessions with two different order of the sub-treatments 
blocks. This implementation was taken to control for possible order effects
7. 
Each trial consisted of two parts. In the first part,  a screen with the relevant information was 
displayed.  The entry fee and the market capacity or expected market capacity for that round 
were displayed with buttons for the participants to choose between entering to the market or 
staying out. After the subjects choose their preferred action a new screen was presented with 
information on their last decision, the number of entrants in the last round, and their payoff.  The 
subjects were to record their decisions and profits for each round.  
  To reduce burden of computation faced by the students we provided them with record 
sheets that have as a header tables that computed  all the possible payoffs for all the different 
possible number of entrants ranging between 0 and 12.   
After  all  the  125  decisions  were  conducted  the  lab  coordinator  randomly  selected  number 
between 1 and 125. The subjects were paid individually the earnings for the selected round at an 
exchange rate of one dollar per experimental dollar, plus the $5 show up fee. 
The experimental sessions lasted approximately two hours. Subjects earned an average of 16.5 
dollars in addition to 5 dollars show up fee. 
                                            
7 In addition to the experimental treatment the subjects also completed a personality test. The 
analysis of this data and its correlation with the behavior on the experiment it is outside the scope 
of this paper. In order to control for possible influence of the additional task the personality task 
was conducted previous to the experimental task for some sessions and posterior to this one for 
another sessions. There is not evidence of influence of the order of the task  on the subjects 
behavior in the experimental task.  
   





In this paper we focus on the population behavior. We tested H1 and H2 but more importantly in 
this section we describe preliminary qualitative findings that we aim to complement with the 
analysis of the individual data and with the addition of new experimental sessions. Each session 
provide  us  with  one  observation  of  the  aggregated  measures.  The  data  set  contain  three 





Finding I. Entry Fees Partially Work at Implementing Social Optimal 
 
 
We would expect The average number of entrants to be inversely related to the entry fee. The 
observed entry is consistent with this expectation. For the sub-treatments with capacity 4, we 
have three conditions, subsidy, no fee and positive fee.  It is also clear that the offered subsidy of 
sub-treatments does not constitute enough incentive to induce a much higher level of entrance. 
The extra 1 unit of earnings is lower than what those entrants can obtain if one of them would 
have decided not to enter.  on the other hand all the other increases in the entry fees have an 
effect on the payoffs of the entrants of the same magnitude of a change in one entrant.  For 
similar markets with capacity of 8 we have an increasing entry fee that goes from no entry fee, to 
four passing by sub0treatments 5 with f=2.  
 
 










                                            
8 Appendix Table I provides a more detailed description of the number of individual choices and 
sessions.  
   




















A different aspect of the effectiveness of the entry fees as an instrument of policy is that one that 
analyze if they can induce the level of entrance than the policy maker desires. This is specially  
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important when the policy maker acts as a MD and wish to induce social optimal levels of 
entrance. Table II presents the summary statistics of entrance. 
 
Table III. Results:  Average Number of Entrants Per Treatment, Sub-treatment and 
Session. 
 
Variable  Theory  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
MEG           
1  2.5  & 3.5  4.15  1.43  1  8 
2  2 & 3  4.27  1.72  1  9 
3  1 & 2  2.53  1.02  0  6 
4  6 & 7  7.29  1.44  4  10 
5  5 & 6  6.20  1.43  2  10 
6  7 & 8  5.45  1.41  2  9 
EMEG           
1  2.5  & 3.5  4.23  1.82  0  9 
2  2 & 3  4.31  1.59  1  9 
3  1 & 2  3.16  1.44  1  8 
4  6 & 7  6.76  1.66  2  12 
5  5 & 6  5.85  1.65  2  10 
6  7 & 8  5.24  1.48  1  8 
 
  
The effectiveness of the entry fees as a policy to induce social optimal behavior relies on how 
closely  aggregated  behavior  is  described  by  the  RNNE.      We  tested  the  hypothesis  that 
aggregated behavior is approximately described by the number of entrants that characterize the 
RNNE via the H1. 
The analysis present what a first sight seems some mixed evident. The results of the different  
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Chi-Square  goodness  of  fit  tests  rejected  the  hypothesis  H1  for  all  the  sub-treatments.    We 
conducted the tests for any possible distribution that distribute most of their mass between the 
two possible values that characterize the RNNE predictions. The rejection of these hypothesis 
implies that the observed entry levels where generated by a different generating distribution that   
those that would be generated when most of subjects behave as they are expected to do if they 
are playing according to the pure strategy Nash equilibria profiles
9.  Figures 2 presents the same 
than Figures 1 but added the two possible numbers of entrants that are characterized by the 
RNNE.  When we decompose the analysis in those sub-treatments with capacity level c=4 and 
those with c=8. We are able to first appreciate that those treatments where the possibility of over 
entry is higher, i.e. c=4, usually presented over-entry.  





   
                                            
9 These rejections are all significative at 1% level. Additionally we tested the hypothesis that all 
the difference between observed choices and their theoretical predictions for any round of each 
sub-treatments has a mean located at zero.   Those hypotheses are all also rejected at 1 % 
significant level.  
   







These figures make clear that for the groups is more difficult to tacitly coordinates in those 
environments (similar markets) where the capacity of the market is low related to the number o f 
potential entrants. In our experiment sub-treatments 1, 2 and 3 have a capacity of one third of the 
potential entrants. With homogenous payoff functions then the potential entrants do not seem to 
have a signal that help them to tacitly coordinate.  It seems that in order to achieve coordination 
around the Nash equilibria levels of entrance they do really need to perform some kind of magic. 
On the other hand for treatments 4, 5 and 6 in certain treatments the observed mean of the 
number of entrance seems to fell between the values that characterize the two possible profiles of 
single strategy Nash equilibria and more or less one. We believe that evidence like this is the 
reason that leaded Kahneman to make his famous comment.  Then the magic of coordination 
seems to work pretty well for environments were congestion is not highly likely.   
After understanding the difficulties of the task we evaluate the predictive power of the theory 
with  a  non-strict  bar.  We  estimated  what  percentage  of  the  observed  rounds  fell  within 
Kahneman’s prediction, this is the number of rounds where the observed number of entrants is  
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between the low Nash equilibria number of entrants -1 and the high Nash equilibria number of 
entrants  +1. This provides each sub0treatment with an interval where three possible levels of 
entrance  satisfy  the  condition.    Providing  room  for  some  non-observable    variables,  other 
regarding preferences, learning and a really broad set of variables that can be accounting for the 
failure  of  the  accuracy  of  the  predictive  power  of  the  theory  to  still  be  included  under  this 
criteria. Therefore under this analysis there is room for errors to still not to produce the failure of 
the hypothesis that the theoretical prediction works. 
The  results  of  the  quantifications  of  the  percentage  of  observations  that  fell  between  the 
Kahneman’s intervals is presented in Table of Results II. 
 
Table Results II.  Proportions of Observed Entrants on the Kahneman’s Interval 
Sub-
treatment 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
MEG  0.35  0.61  0.87  0.27  0.79  0.75 
session_1  0.32  0.56  0.88  0.24  0.80  0.68 
session_2  0.32  0.56  1.00  0.20  0.72  0.76 
session_3  0.40  0.72  0.72  0.36  0.84  0.80 
EMEG  0.36  0.54  0.81  0.42  0.78  0.74 
session_1  0.40  0.44  0.72  0.32  0.84  0.68 
session_2  0.48  0.40  0.80  0.28  0.69  0.80 
session_3  0.32  0.80  0.92  0.72  0.68  0.72 
session_4  0.24  0.52  0.80  0.36  0.88  0.76 
 
 
It is straightforward to see that the proportion of rounds where the observed number of entrants 
fell outside the Kahneman’s interval varies considerably between the different sub-treatments. 
This can be between approximately 64% of the round in sub treatments 1 to only approximately 
13% of the rounds on the sub-treatments 3.  It is interesting to notice that the same variance on 
the probability of being located around the aggregated equilibrium behavior is given for both  
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types of treatments.  The last table seems to signalize a relationship between the level of the 
entry and the ability of a group to tacitly coordinate.  This is surprising specially for treatments 
like treatment 3, where  subjects face a low capacity and a high entry fee letting really small 
room to coordinate and a lot of chance to be out of the equilibria.  
  
By decomposing the analysis in these two types of treatments we recognize the limitations of the 
theoretical framework based on Nash equilibria to explain the observed human behavior.  We are 
not the first ones to recognize this limitation Goree and Holt (2000) recognize the presence of 
anomalous  behavior  in  binary  choice  environments.    They  also  recognize  that  the  Nash 
equilibrium concept is not able to fully explain the observed behavior. They propose to use 
quantal response equilibria (McKelvey and Palfrey 1995) as a better concept to understand the 
behavior of the experimental subjects in these environments.   Goree and Holt proposition 2, 
claims: 
“In the quantal response equilibrium for the entry game, there is over-entry resulting in negative 
net expected payoffs when the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is less than 1/2. The reverse 
effect, under-entry, occurs when the mixed Nash equilibrium is greater than 1/2.” 
based on this proposition and the fact that we can estimate the probability of entering given a 
mixed strategy Nash equilibria by equation 2. Then we can compare the predictions generated by 
applying this proposition with our observations for each one of our experimental sub-treatments. 
This analysis is  presented in the following table 
Table II. Gore and Holt Predictions Based on QRE 
Treatment  1  2  3  4  5  6 

























In this table we can observe that qualitative the QRE concept do a much better job in predicting 
the direction of the observed behavior that the Nash equilibria. Still the practical implication in 
terms  of  policy  design  are  limited  as  it  is  expressed  by  Haile  et.  al  (2008).    Therefore  we 
observed that the Nash equilibria has limited utility to induce the desired level of entrance in our 
experimental treatments.  Further research in terms of theoretical concepts and their implications  
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Corollary Finding I. Entry Fees Reduced the Observed Over Entry 
 
 The influence over derived result of the partial efficacy of the entry fee seems that the economic 
incentives generated by the  entry fee are more important that the strategic uncertainty that it can 
generates by changing subjects belief regarding how the others will react to the entry fee and 
leading them to play more strategically. The fact that entry fees reduce over entry is displayed in 
the following table. 
 
 
Table Results III.  Proportions of Over-Entry 
Sub-treatment  MEG  EMEG 
1  0.89  0.87 
2  0.63  0.65 
3  0.03  0.17 
4  0.89  0.76 
5  0.40  0.34 
6  0.05  0.07 
   
 
The analysis deduced from the Kahneman’s interval to the over-entry analysis given the intrinsic 
asymmetries  those  environments  plausible  of  congestion  present.  As  Anderson  et  al.  (2008) 
highlighted these asymmetries are present in the market entry game. Under entry in this game 
produce  extraordinary  profits  for  those  potential  participants  that  decided  to  enter  without 
harming the non-entrant ones. Therefore in under-entry rounds the average payoff is above the 
status  quo  value.  On  the  other  hand  over  entry  generates  that  the  entrants  are  obtaining 
extraordinary losses making the average payoff of the players lower that those that would have 
been obtained if the market was not an option.     
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Finally we will be interested in understanding the cost of disequilibria. We understand this as the 
differences between the status quo average payments generated by disequilibrium behavior. The 
analysis of this cost present a greater complexity than the analysis of the entry behavior given 
that this cost is a function not only of the subjects behavior but also of the parameters that 
characterize  each  sub-treatment.  In  the  case  of  the  EMEG  the  individual  profits  are  also 
influenced by the realization of the random variable and the incentives that they generate on the 
participants. The analysis of this cost is outside the scope of this paper.  
We present the of average individual profits per sub-treatment and experimental session in the 
appendix. the remarkable feature of the experiment is the failure of the individuals to tacitly 
coordinate. If we desired to analyze from an evolutionary point of view the chances that a new 






 Finding II.  The Aggregated Behavior Does Not Reject the Possibility of Risk Neutrality. 
 
H2, test idea of risk neutral behavior over all the 125 experimental rounds, 6 sub-treatments by 
testing: 
 
H2.   
But H2 tests constitutes  joint hypothesis of risk aversion and stability of risk aversion over all 
sub-treatments. A Mann Whitney test of H2 can not reject H2 (z =   1.739 and  Prob > |z| =   
0.0821).  
When instead of H2. We test sub0treament by sub-treatment. 
H3.   
 
Then H3 is rejected for al test sub-treatment per sub-treatment we rejected the hypothesis of 
equality  of  the  means  for  each  sub-treatment  at  1%  level  of  significance.  These  results  are 
reflected in Figures 1. The average number of entrants for sub-treatments with low capacity 
(1,2,3) is greater for the EMEG treatment than for the MEG. On the other hand for treatments 
with larger capacity the opposite result is observed.  
   






This  paper  examines  how  capacity  characteristics  and  entry  fees  affect  entrance  and  co-
ordination in a market entry game.  The analysis is based on lab experiments implementing 
modifications to the market entry game.  
One modification entailed the introduction of an entry fee.  The fees induced changes in the 
behavior  in  the  direction  predicted  by  the  theoretical  model.  Tacit  coordination  was  poorly 
achieved for the groups, for most of the rounds they failed to co-ordinate. Only in 3 sessions in 3 
scenarios where the expected capacity was eight the subjects were able to obtain an average 
profit greater than if they stay out
10. These preliminary results are consistent with literature that 
has found excess entry can be based on over confidence. Camerer and Lovallo (1999) observed 
that  over  confidence  subjects  trend  to  ignore  what  other  players  behavior  and  rationality 
increasing  their  beliefs  to  perform  well  lead  them  to  take  entry  in  a  careless  way  A  better 
instrument to induce a better tacit coordination therefore might be achieved just by improving the 
ability of players to form coherent beliefs regarding other actions. 
 
A second modification entailed the introduction of capacity risk.  Subjects decision to enter react 
differently to the introduction of this uncertainty to different levels of capacity.  For low capacity 
treatments the introduction of risk induced higher entry levels. The opposite was observed for 









                                            
10 This is shown I the appendix table A5. To test the ability to perform better than the outside 
option in cases with random capacity more sessions are needed. The current  result are 
preliminary and they might have been influenced by the random draws in those specific sessions.   
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Appendix 
 




1  2  3  4  5  6 
MEG  900  900  900  900  900  900 
904241129  300  300  300  300  300  300 
904271143  300  300  300  300  300  300 
911191148  300  300  300  300  300  300 
EMEG  1200  1200  1200  1200  1056  1200 
904271422  300  300  300  300  300  300 
909241018  300  300  300  300  156*  300 
1011191021  300  300  300  300  300  300 
1102281430  300  300  300  300  300  300 
* This session had software problems when the subjects were participating in the round 
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1  2  3  4  5  6 
MEG  4.15  4.27  2.53  7.29  6.20  5.45 
904241129  4.2  4.8  2.6  7.28  6.48  5.56 
904271143  4.48  4.24  2.96  7.72  6.2  5.48 
911191148  3.76  3.76  2.04  6.88  5.92  5.32 
EMEG  4.23  4.31  3.16  6.76  5.85  5.24 
904271422  3.92  4.56  3.36  7.04  6.16  4.92 
909241018  3.8  5.12  3.64  7.2  6.15  5.52 
1011191021  4.48  3.36  2.72  5.92  5.36  5.08 









1  2  3  4  5  6 
z  -1.494  -1.104  -9.846  8.131  5.930  2.531 
Prob > |z|  0.1351  0.2695  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0114 
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A4. Table Standard Deviation of Average Number of Entrants Per Treatment and Sub-




1  2  3  4  5  6 
MEG  1.43  1.72  1.02  1.44  1.43  1.41 
904241129  1.27  1.96  1.06  1.15  1.21  1.75 
904271143  1.48  1.40  0.72  1.43  1.75  1.27 
911191148  1.45  1.58  1.04  1.59  1.23  1.12 
EMEG  1.82  1.59  1.44  1.66  1.65  1.48 
904271422  1.60  1.27  1.55  1.56  1.49  1.50 
909241018  1.70  1.82  1.65  2.19  2.08  1.48 
1011191021  1.90  1.20  0.87  1.23  1.79  1.06 
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A5. Table of Average Individual Profit Per Treatment and Sub-treatment 
 
Row Labels  1  2  3  4  5  6 
MEG  16.21  15.61  16.60  16.30  16.45  16.26 
904241129  16.24  14.92  16.55  16.44  16.24  15.97 
904271143  15.91  15.80  16.44  15.73  16.29  16.29 
911191148  16.49  16.11  16.81  16.72  16.83  16.51 
EMEG  15.77  15.76  16.03  16.85  16.72  16.31 
904271422  15.89  15.41  15.73  16.49  16.60  16.32 
909241018  15.86  15.23  15.74  15.93  15.74  16.45 
1011191021  15.81  16.49  16.56  17.88  16.55  16.37 








1  2  3  4  5  6 
z  0.265  -2.585  2.563  -5.046  5.930  -1.743 
Prob > |z|  0.7912  0.0097  0.0104  0.0000  0.0000  0.0813 
Reject  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
 
 